In this paper we propose a unifi ed framework for the representation of diff erent types of indefi nite pronouns and determiners in terms of referential anchoring . Referential anchoring is a pragmatic operation that establishes a functional dependency between the referent of an indefinite DP and some other discourse item. As such, the idea of referential anchoring is not new (cf. Kratzer, 1998; von Heusinger, 2002; Kamp and Bende-Farkas, 2010, etc.), however there is some confusion in the discussion of referential anchoring regarding exceptional scope readings. We claim that referential anchoring is independent of scope, even though referentially anchored functional readings often entail exceptional scope readings. We make a transparent formal proposal for referential anchoring that draws on the idea of domain narrowing in the sense of Schwarzschild (2002) . Finally, we present the advantage of our analysis by applying it to the Russian indefi nite determiners kakoj-to , koe-kakoj and kakoj-nibud' .
Introduction
It has been observed by Haspelmath ( 1997 ) and many others that, crosslinguistically, there is a great amount of variation in the meaning of indefi nite pronouns and determiners. Th e notion of specifi city has often been called upon to account for some of the arising contrasts (cf. von Heusinger ( 2011 ) for a recent multi-layered proposal), but for the time being a unifi ed semantic framework for dealing with this variation is still lacking, partly because it is often unclear what exactly such a framework should be able to model: in particular, whether for instance epistemic specifi city , i.e. identifi ability by the speaker, and exceptional scope readings over scope islands are the same phenomenon or not. We attempt to deliver such a framework in this paper that partly contributes to disentangling these phenomena.
In particular, we develop a unifi ed analysis for three Russian indefi nite determiners that might seem unrelated: the epistemically specifi c koe-kakoj , the scopally-specifi c kakoj-to and the non-specifi c kakoj-nibud' (terms from Farkas, 1995 ) . Our analysis improves in predictiveness on previous approaches like Kagan ( 2007 ) , Yanovich ( 2005 ) and Pereltsvaig ( 2008 ) . In addition, it has the advantage that it uses exactly the same representational format for all three determiners such that the diff erence between their meanings boils down to diff erent constraints on a more general pragmatic mechanism that we call referential anchoring (term from von Heusinger, 2002 ) .
Th e basic idea of referential anchoring is very simple and widespread across the literature: an indefi nite establishes a functional dependency between some discourse item and the "intended referent". Th ere have been a number of implementations of this idea: most infl uentially, Kratzer ( 1998 ) uses Skolemized choice functions (see also von Heusinger, 2002 ) , but one can alternatively use plain Skolem functions as shown in Bende- Farkas and Kamp ( 2001 ) , cf. also Steedman ( 2007 ) , Endriss ( 2009 ) and from another pragmatic perspective Dekker ( 2008 ) .
We propose a particular formalization of referential anchoring, which is mathematically nearly equivalent with Kratzer ( 1998 ) but comes with some conceptual advantages. We take this to be very important, so we will briefl y outline it in the following.
In particular, we suggest (similar to Dekker, 2004 Dekker, , 2008 ) that referential anchoring is -at its very core -a pragmatic phenomenon. Using an indefi nite the speaker generally introduces a new discourse item, which for reasons of simplicity we model in a classical way as an existential quantifi er. However, the speaker may have so-called referential intentions whenever using an indefi nite. Th ese intentions could be translated into saying that he has a particular individual in mind or some dependency on other individuals, which, for Dekker to the editors of the International Review of Pragmatics , especially Ken Turner, for valuable comments. Of course, all remaining shortcomings are our own. ( 2004 , 2008 ) , is a specifi c pragmatic dimension of the interpretation of indefinites. However, one could also think of these referential intentions in terms of domain narrowing, as in Schwarzschild ( 2002 ) : if the speaker utters (1), she may on the one hand commit herself to the truth of (1a) but, in addition, she may also mean that not any boy will do, but only a subset of the boys C, which may ultimately contain only the one and only boy he actually sees swimming. We side with Schwarzschild ( 2002 ) here because we do not see the conceptual gain of additional levels of meaning representation.
(1) A boy swims.
a
. (∃ x )(B( x ) & S( x )) b. (∃ x )(B( x ) & C( x ) & S( x ))
If referential anchoring is indeed a domain narrowing mechanism, it should be represented as such. For this reason we assume that referential anchoring amounts to including a functional dependency into the restrictor of an existential quantifi er. Th e advantage is that this makes the relation between a plain indefi nite and a referentially anchored one transparent, in contrast to Kratzer's (1998) ambiguity approach. Of course, as soon as referential anchoring gets lexically coded, as in the case of the indefi nite determiners we analyze in this paper, the pragmatic dimension goes away and we end up saying something very similar to Kratzer ( 1998 ) , but we do not need choice functions, which we take to be a real conceptual advantage. We discuss this point at some length. Our proposal also diff ers from Dekker ( 2008 ) . Our domain narrowing is just as pragmatic as Dekker's system, but it doesn't include any special dimension of meaning. Th is apparently comes at a cost: our approach fails to model the scope-island violating behaviour of indefi nites in a straightforward way (just like Kratzer, 1998 , and as far as we can reconstruct also Dekker, 2008 , himself ) . We discuss this issue in Section 1 and argue that this is a desirable consequence, for we think exceptional, island-violating, scope for indefi nites should not be modelled with referential anchoring in the fi rst place. Th e reason is simply that a) referential anchoring, as we understand it, is a means to deal with functional readings, and b) as Schwarz ( 2001 ) argues, functional readings are diff erent from genuine scopal readings. We will extend the results of Schwarz ( 2001 ) and say that there is no obvious reason to assume that functional readings involve an island-constraint violation. And there is also no obvious reason why there should be any kind of referential anchoring at work in genuine exceptional scope readings.
We do not propose here a theory of exceptional wide scope for indefi nites. For explicitness, we will follow Endriss ( 2009 ) in assuming that indefi nites are free to move out of scope islands whenever they are topical. Alternatively one can use an independence friendly logical approach to the existential quantifi er which allows scope out of islands, as in Farkas and Brasoveanu ( 2009 ) but as far as we can see, there is way too little clarity in the data patterns to make anything hinge on this particular decision (cf. Ionin, 2010 , for new experimental data suggesting that not only bona fi de indefi nites can escape scope islands and Heim, 2011 , for a similarly sceptical review of the situation). So, our proposal is meant to be independent of whatever theory may prove best for the scope of indefi nites, as long as indefi nites are treated as quantifi cational, in the sense that they have something like a restrictor.
Summing up, in this paper we provide a particular notation of referential anchoring based on a domain narrowing operation, we show with examples from Russian that referential anchoring can account for some surprising variation in the meaning of indefi nite determiners -which is the main empirical contribution of our paper -and we claim that a large part of what referential anchoring cannot do, namely modelling genuine scopal readings, is actually an independent issue.
Th e structure of this paper is as follows: fi rst, we discuss the diff erence between functional readings and genuine scopal readings. Th en, we lay out a formalism for referential anchoring as domain narrowing. Finally, we present the analysis of the Russian indefi nite pronouns and open some further research questions.
Functional Readings and Domain Narrowing
Th e aim of this section is to show that functional readings and exceptional scope readings are unrelated and need not be modelled by one and the same mechanism. We propose that functional readings are always instances of domain narrowing and thereby neutralize scope. In other words, Schwarzschild ( 2002 ) was right about functional indefi nites (although wrong about plain exceptional scope readings). We propose a particular formal representation of functional readings as domain narrowing and argue that it has some advantages compared to Kratzer ( 1998 ) .
Functional Readings vs. Scopal Readings
In this section we argue that functional readings exist and must be represented in the semantics of particular indefi nite determiners.
Compare (2a) and (2b) (adapted from Hintikka, 1986 ) . In the most prominent reading of (2a) some date has narrow scope under each husband , hence the sentence says that for each husband there is a date that he forgot.
1 Th ere are also other notions in the literature that capture the same intuition. Ebert and Endriss ( 2007 ) argue that such functions must be nameable in natural language, Sharvit ( 1997 ) speaks of salient functions. To better capture the intuitions behind what is often called natural function Jacobson ( 1999 : 160) suggests the notion of procedurally defi ned functions . She points out that a random list of ordered pairs -while extensionally equivalent to a procedurally defi ned function -does not count as a "function" in this sense. We will stick with Jacobson's notion of procedurally defi ned functions in this paper, but call it natural for simplicity.
(2b) apparently expands on this by specifying which date each husband forgot. Th e pronoun his is bound by every husband and the whole apposition specifi es a function which assigns particular dates to married men, i.e. the date of their wife's birthday. Readings like (2b) are known as functional readings. (2) (2) a. Each husband had forgotten some date.
b. Each husband had forgotten some date -his wife's birthday.
(2) does not establish that functional readings are genuine readings of indefinites, however. In (2) the functional narrow reading can be seen as a special case of the plain narrow scope reading. On the narrow scope reading (2a) entails that there is a function which assigns to every husband a date he had forgotten ((3a) and the Skolem Form (3b) are equivalent) and in (2b) this function is specifi ed as his wife's birthday , as shown in (3c). For deriving this, one does not need to assume that (2) actually has a semantically derivable functional reading.
One can show, however, that functional readings are genuine readings that must be semantically coded in some way. (4), the original example from Hintikka ( 1986 ) allows for the continuation in (4a) but a continuation like (4b) is no good. Th e essential diff erence between (4a) and (4b) is that the former represents a sensible/natural function (Chierchia 1993 ) , 1 while (4b) contains a random set of ordered pairs and there is no ground for assuming that there is any natural function which has such random values. Hence the generalization seems to be that a certain requires that dates are assigned to husbands in a natural, systematic way. A non-systematic pair list will not suffi ce to identify this function.
(4) Each husband had forgotten a certain date a. … his wife's birthday. b. … #John had forgotten Mary's birthday, Michael his wedding anniversary etc.
It follows that (3a) or the equivalent (3b) is not an appropriate representation of (4), since it doesn't rule out the continuation in (4b). A better candidate would be (5a), which restricts the number of functions under consideration to the natural ones. (5a), on its own, is stronger and hence asymmetrically entails (3a) and (3b). Note that we use the Skolem form in (5a) for reasons of simplicity and not of necessity, one could include the functional dependency in a plain representation as an existential quantifi er as well, as somewhat redundantly done in (5b).
Th e negation of (4) given in (6a) allows for the functional reading in (6b). Crucially, (6b) is entailed by the negation of the narrow scope reading of (2a), given in (6c). Even more importantly, (6a) does not have the negation given in (6c). (At the same time, it is unclear whether (2a) does have the reading in (6b), but even if this reading exists, it cannot be derived from the plain existential quantifi er reading without further additions, as there is no confi guration under which the negation scopes over the universal quantifi er and under the existential quantifi er and the existential quantifi er still scopes below the universal.) (6) a. Not every husband had forgotten a certain date.
If this is correct, a functional narrow reading is not purely pragmatic and needs to be coded as part of the meaning of expressions like a certain date. item.
2 Note that it is not easy to distinguish between wide functional readings and plain wide scope readings.
After having established that functional readings exist and that they should be modelled as part of the meaning of indefi nite determiners like a certain (and possibly also of some ), we now turn to the question how functional readings should be modelled.
Exceptional Scope and Functional Readings
Schwarz ( 2001 ) claims that functional indefi nites should/could be analyzed in terms of Skolemized choice functions in the sense of Kratzer ( 1998 ) . We propose that functional indefi nites need not be analyzed that way, because there is a simpler way to do it. However, we agree with Schwarz ( 2001 ) contra Kratzer ( 1998 ) that plain exceptional scope readings should be analyzed differently from functional readings. We do not discuss alternative analyses, but refer to Bende-Farkas and Kamp ( 2001 ) , Schwarz ( 2001 ) and Endriss ( 2009 ) for exhaustive overviews of the choice functional analyses proposed in the literature. Kratzer ( 1998 ) assumes that indefi nites are ambiguous between plain existential quantifi ers as (7a) and so-called Skolemized choice functions. Simplifying somewhat, Skolemized choice functions are functions of type 〈 e , 〈〈 e , t 〉, e 〉〉. Th ey take a variable as an argument and return a choice function, which takes a set and returns one of its members (〈〈 e , t 〉, e 〉). So, an indefi nite like a boy is ambiguous between the representation as an existential quantifi er, given in (7a), and the choice function representation in (7b). A functional indefi nite like a certain boy will only have the choice function representation in (7b), however. Kratzer's notation is a bit diff erent but amounts to the same in all respects. In Kratzer's system f is contextually determined, however, y can be bound sentence-internally as well. Th is allows her to model the example (4) as shown in (8), where f is treated as some salient natural contextual function.
Historically, Kratzer's (1998) system has a number of advantages over the analyses she intends to expand, but from today's point of view, as we see it, the use of choice functions seems unnecessary. To explain this point we start with some very brief background.
Probably the most famous commonplace about indefi nites is that they can scope out of scope islands (Fodor and Sag, 1982 ) , whereas other quantifi ers cannot. For example the universal quantifi er every football player in (9) can take local scope inside the relative clause, as paraphrased in (9a), but not wide scope, as in (9b), while in (10) the indefi nite some football player has both the local scope reading given in (10a) and the reading in (10b). Readings like (10b) are known as exceptional (wide) scope readings. In analyzing (10b) one should, if possible, preserve the syntactic island constraints and avoid a representation with the structure given in (10c), for in that case the existential quantifi er is in a syntactically illicit LF-position.
(9) John read every book that every football player signed.
a. Existing reading: John read every book that was signed by all football players. b. Non-existing reading: For every football player, John read every book he signed. (10) Every girl read every book that some football player signed.
a. Existing reading: Every girl read every book that was signed by any football player. b. Existing reading: Th ere is a football player such that every girl read every book signed by him. c. ∃FP(∀G(∀B(R))) Fodor and Sag ( 1982 ) proposed to analyze indefi nites such as some football player as in (10b) as an individual constant. Th is means that the indefi nite is no longer a quantifi er but a constant having the value of the individual football player the speaker has in mind when uttering (10). However, it turns out that intermediate scope readings are also possible, as paraphrased in (11). Th is is not predicted by the analysis of indefi nites as constants, and again, an LF of the type (11a) is syntactically illicit.
(11) For every girl, there is a football player, such that she read every book that he signed.
a. ∀G(∃FP(∀B(R)))
Here is a very simple-minded solution: take the Skolem-form of the plain intermediate scope representation. Now it is the function variable that leaves the scope island. Th is is not very satisfying, though, since the actual semantic contribution of the indefi nite, both its lexical restrictor and its existential force are still outside the scope island -in other words, this is just a notational diff erence compared to a plain existential quantifi er.
It is possible, however, to leave the descriptive material in situ, by introducing choice functions. A choice function will take the descriptive material of the indefi nite and return one of its members, i.e. it is a function of type 〈〈 e , t 〉, e 〉. Here, we use the Reinhart ( 1997 )/ Winter ( 1997 ) style notation.
Obviously (12) and (13) are equivalent, except for the way they handle the case in which there are no football players at all. In this case the Skolem function variant will predict falsity and the choice function variant will predict oddity (i.e. undefi nedness), but Schwarz ( 2001 ) shows that this part is not essentially dependent on choice functions as such. Th ere are a number of reasons why a choice function analysis along these lines is not very helpful. For one thing, it cannot model intermediate functional readings at all, furthermore it runs into an overgeneration problem discussed in Schwarz ( 2001 ) that is irrelevant for our argumentation, and most obviously, the conceptual gain in introducing a choice function with regard to the use of a Skolem function is anything but obvious: after all, the existential quantifi er is still outside the scope island, and if this was a problem for Skolem functions, why would it be less problematic for choice functions? Th is is even more dramatic, as the existential closure of Skolem functions is a default widest scope operation, whereas choice functions have to be existentially closed in the scope of other quantifi ers in the sentence. In a way, then, choice functions simply emulate scope, transferring the essential step of existential closure onto the function variable in the way Skolem functions do, but their interpretation crucially depends on the position of the existential closure in the logical form. In addition, Schwarz ( 2001 ) also shows that the resulting LF representations with choice functions tend to get dubious.
Note that unlike Skolem functions, choice functions do not have the potential to model intermediate functional readings. Th e reason is very simple: there is nothing in a plain choice functional representation that would actually model the functional dependency arising in functional readings. Kratzer ( 1998 ) solves this problem by adding a so-called Skolem variable to the representation and eliminating existential closure altogether. Th e Skolem variable takes care of the functional dependency as already shown above. Th e same formalism also models widest scope, since the Skolem variable may be bound sentence-externally, or simply be a constant like the speaker. Th is is a clear advantage of Kratzer ( 1998 ) over Reinhart ( 1997 )/ Winter ( 1997 and some other related analyses. However, Chierchia ( 2001 ) and even more explicitly Schwarz ( 2001 ) show that Kratzer ( 1998 ) Consider for example (14a), which illustrates the famous Chierchia ( 2001 ) problem: the example has the reading paraphrased in (14b). Th is reading can be derived with the system proposed by Kratzer and is given in (14c). Note that as long as the variable f is not existentially bound, (14c) is not a fully correct representation of (14b), but if one binds the f variable at the highest possible level of sentential representation, as in Matthewson ( 1999 ) , the diff erence disappears, as shown in (14d). (14) a. Every woman ate all the cookies some man has brought.
b. For every woman there is a man such that she ate all cookies he brought.
Th is reading can also be negated as in (15a) giving rise to a reading that is formally given in (15c) and can be paraphrased as in (15b).
(15) a. Not every woman ate all the cookies some man has brought. b. It is not the case that for every woman there is a man such that she ate all cookies he brought.
Th is reading is verifi ed by a woman for whom there is no man such that she ate all the cookies he brought. It is easy to see that such a reading cannot be represented in Kratzer's (1998) system, because if the choice function is not existentially bound inside the negation, we will always get readings that negate the cookie eating for pairs of men and women but no reading that actually claims that there are no such pairings. On the other hand, if the choice function were existentially bound inside the scope of negation, other problems would arise in other types of examples we do not wish to dwell upon here, since we independently know that Kratzer ( 1998 ) does not allow for existential binding of the choice functions inside the clause in the fi rst place, cf. Bende- Farkas and Kamp ( 2001 ) and Schwarz ( 2001 ) for a very detailed discussion of this point.
As noted above (14c) is itself not a plain intermediate scope reading. Kratzer ( 1998 ) actually predicts a functional reading in which there is a specifi c contextually identifi able function which assigns cookie-bringing-men to women, e.g. their fathers-in-law, and then it is asserted that every woman ate every cookie brought by the man assigned to her by that function. We have seen already that functional readings entail the corresponding plain scopal reading but negating the sentence as in (15) shows that the readings are diff erent. So, Kratzer ( 1998 ) cannot derive the plain intermediate scope under negation not because her system has a problem interacting with negation but because it was never designed to derive plain scopal readings (even though apparently intended otherwise by Kratzer) and it only apparently derived such readings in upward entailing contexts. Still, while Kratzer ( 1998 ) cannot derive real scopal readings, she provides an excellent account for functional readings.
Indeed, Kratzer ( 2003 ) correctly argues that, while Chierchia's (2001) criticism is right, (15) does have a functional intermediate reading that is predicted by her approach, a reading such that assuming some salient pairing of women and men, the negation only refers to such pairs as shown in (16) and formally represented in (16a).
(16) Not every woman ate all the cookies some man has brought, namely her father-in-law.
Given this situation, Schwarz ( 2001 ) concludes that we may need both Kratzer's (1998) choice functional approach and some scope shifting theory: one for functional readings, and one for true scopal readings. Th ere is nothing new in our argumentation so far, but now we arrive at a problem. Th e original problem that motivated the use of choice functions for indefi nites was that they apparently escape scope islands. Now, it turns out that whenever they have plain scopal readings above scope islands, choice functions are pretty much useless. If one could show that functional readings involve scope island escaping, we would arguably need choice functions to model them. However, it is not trivial to show this. In fact we will show in the next section that for functional readings indefi nites don't need to escape scope islands, not because they are choice functions, but for the very simple reason (noted in Schwarzschild, 2002 ) that functional readings neutralize scope. But then, there doesn't seem to be much motivation left for choice functions. One alternative would be to use Skolem functions instead; cf. Bende- Farkas and Kamp ( 2001 ) and Endriss ( 2009 ) for such proposals. We will not discuss this option at any length here because they are technically very similar to what we propose in the next section, however, we think that our formalism has the conceptual advantage of being essentially a domain narrowing approach.
Functional Readings as Domain Narrowing
In this section we fi rst propose that functional readings can be thought of as a domain narrowing mechanism, whereby we also present a formalism that models this insight. Second we provide some arguments why our formalism is conceptually superior to Kratzer's (1998) analysis. Schwarzschild ( 2002 ) discusses cases like (17), which involve scope islands. (17) has two readings that are interesting for this discussion: the wide scope reading in (17a) (most plausible for normal people) and the narrow scope reading in (17b) (plausible for people coming from very rich families). Schwarzschild ( 2002 ) claims that the wide scope reading is only apparent.
(17) If some relative of mine dies, I will inherit a fortune.
a. Th ere is a relative of mine such that if he dies I inherit a fortune. b. If there is a relative of mine who dies, I inherit a fortune.
Assuming that the domain of quantifi cation is restricted to the one and only rich relative of the speaker the narrow scope reading has the same truth conditions as a wide scope reading, since in both cases (with an appropriate semantics for the conditional) only the particularly rich relative can verify or falsify the sentence. Th is is a general mechanism of scope neutralization. If the hearer assumes that the speaker quantifi es over a set containing only one individual, he will never be able to distinguish between narrow and wide scope readings. While this may seem intuitive, the question could arise why an indefi nite is used in (17) in the fi rst place, since a defi nite expression would be the natural choice whenever the domain of quantifi cation is a singleton set. However, if the speaker were to use the defi nite article he would imply that either he only has one relative or that the hearer knows which relative he has in mind. What happens here instead is reducing the restrictor to a singleton whose extension is not assumed to be known by the hearer. Rather, the hearer will guess (if supported by the context) that the speaker is actually speaking about one particular relative of his, whom the hearer may not be familiar with.
Schwarzschild claims that domain narrowing to a singleton may also account for apparent intermediate scope readings. Consider King's (1988) famous example given in (18), which exhibits a wide scope reading (18a), an intermediate reading (18b) and a narrow scope reading (18c). Consider also (19). In (19), the indefi nite quantifi es over a set that is restricted by the value of a variable bound by the quantifi er each author . Now, under the assumption that each author has written exactly one book that was deemed pornographic, we get the truth conditional equivalence between the narrow scope and the intermediate scope reading, which is exactly what we wanted. Th is way the diff erence between narrow scope and intermediate scope is neutralized in the process of interpretation. To extend this analysis to example (18) all that needs to be done is to postulate a covert domain restriction in (18) that is part of the restrictor NP of the indefi nite determiner and that includes a variable bound by the subject quantifi er. Adding the covert material he had written is one way to restrict the domain, one may also use diff erent material like he had written in one year , he has heard that his best friend has written , he has been working on , he has been reading about , etc.
(18) Each author in this room despises every publisher who would not publish a book that was deemed pornographic. a. Th ere is a book that was deemed pornographic such that for every author in this room it is the case that he despises every publisher who would not publish that book. b. For each author in this room there is a book that was deemed pornographic such that he despises every publisher who would not publish that book. c. For each author in this room it is the case that he despises every publisher such that there is a book that was deemed pornographic that he would not publish. (19) Each author i in this room despises every publisher who would not publish a book he i had written that was deemed pornographic. Schwarzschild ( 2002 ) requires domain narrowing to a singleton, but whenever there is a domain reduction to a singleton depending on some variable that is quantifi ed over in the sentence, in fact a function is introduced into the restrictor of the existential quantifi er: he i had written that was deemed pornographic is nothing but a function from individuals i to corresponding books. For this reason we can use the notation in (20) . Th e variable f is a contextually salient function, just as in Kratzer's representation, but it is ontologically simpler than a Skolemized choice function, being of type 〈 e , e 〉. Th is allows us to model the example (21(=(4)) as shown in (22).
We propose the notation in (20) as a general framework for functional readings and argue that it is conceptually superior to Kratzer's (1998) . For one thing, (20) transparently models the idea that functional readings are a matter of domain narrowing. Domain narrowing is a pragmatic operation at its core. Th is means that in order to model functional readings for indefinites that do not code these readings lexically, it suffi ces to introduce a functional dependency at the level of pragmatics. Th is is already an advantage over Kratzer ( 1998 ) , who would be forced to assume lexical ambiguity in any indefinite that allows both functional readings and plain scopal readings. We, on the other hand, may simply assume that whenever an indefi nite that does not necessarily trigger functional readings receives a functional interpretation this is a pragmatic process that comes on top of the interpretation as a plain existential quantifi er. Of course, for indefi nites that lexically encode functional readings, like a certain, we can assume that the requirement for domain narrowing via some functional dependency is lexically coded.
Second, domain narrowing neutralizes scope ((23a) and (23b) are equivalent). Th is means that exceptional wide scope readings will never be a problem for functional readings, as in fact there is no need to assume that the indefi nite actually gets wide or intermediate scope. We can just as well leave it down in the island and neutralize its scope by inserting a functional dependency. If this is correct, it follows that there is no conceptual reason for introducing choice functions to analyze functional readings. Moreover, since we know that choice functions also fail on plain scopal readings, we can conclude that they are simply obsolete.
Th ere are also some practical reasons to believe that a choice function will not do the job anyway. Consider (24) (=(4a)) more carefully. Th e question is how his wife's birthday can specify the function variable introduced in the fi rst part of the sentence.
(24) Each husband had forgotten a certain date -his wife's birthday.
In our system what needs to be contextually specifi ed is a function from individuals to individuals. It turns out that the most natural conceivable analysis of his wife's birthday is λz.ιy.WB(z)(y), which is precisely a function from individuals to individuals as predicted. Th is is clearly noted in (23a). Now consider Kratzer's version. For Kratzer ( 1998 ) , what needs to be contextually specifi ed is a function from individuals to choice functions. But it is certainly harder to imagine how his wife's birthday can be analyzed in such a way. We have a type mismatch. Th ere is a conceivable rescue for Kratzer's system, but this leads to complications: note that the individual argument of f is he and the set argument must be the set of dates, as shown in (8). First, we would need to split up his wife's birthday to the P of birth of x's wife , which is the structure required by Kratzer's analysis. Th is could be then equated to f . Th is would be a function, however, that hardly applies to anything but dates, years, decades etc. In fact it is easy to construct examples which will not work for any other set but the restrictor of the indefi nite itself, e.g. the P he married , which would be one of those f -functions which don't seem to make much sense. Of course, Kratzer ( 1998 ) explicitly assumes that f is a partial function, but once it gets so partial that it can only take one set as an argument, its usefulness can be seriously questioned. In addition, equating f and the P of birth of x's wife would require abstraction over the P variable (which is the property of being a day), which, again, is even technically a nontrivial operation, especially in a semantic framework like Heim and Kratzer ( 1998 ) .
Th e presuppositionality of choice functions turns out to be tricky as well. Choice functions can model existential presuppositions in a very elegant way, since they are undefi ned whenever the set they take as an argument is empty. Kratzer's (1998) framework predicts that whenever there are no dates at all (4) should be as odd as a presupposition failure can be. In fact, there is no way in Kratzer's system in which the value of f ( x )(D) would not be a date. But it seems that the presupposition is not only that there are dates but also that whatever f ultimately selects is a date. In our system this presupposition is easy to incorporate, even though we will mostly omit this part of the formula for readability.
Now, there is a very interesting diff erence in predictions between our system and Kratzer's: since we presuppose that f is a function that assigns dates to whatever, we expect any overt specifi cation of f to satisfy this presupposition. Hence, we expect that one can only specify the function variable in an apposition, or with the specifi cational particle namely , in a construction that overtly specifi es a function that will always have dates as a value. Th is is typically done by saying: the date that such and such . Crucially, however, Kratzer's presupposition works through defi nedness conditions on choice functions, therefore in principle she would allow any kind of continuation of the type the P of birth of x's wife , for this would identify the function variable suffi ciently. But quite generally this is not possible. Hence, for (26) we correctly predict that only the a. continuation is correct, whereas Kratzer would allow the b. continuation as well. We judge (26b) to only be acceptable with the wide reading for a certain doctor , i.e. every woman loves the same doctor, and he saved someone's life. Summing up: we propose the representation in (20) for functional indefi nites and the abandoning of choice functional approaches. We do not claim that Skolemized choice functions will necessarily fail on functional readings but since they lead to problems and additional complexity, we think that an easier, domain narrowing approach should be adopted: we call this referential anchoring.
Referential Anchoring
In this section we develop the idea of referential anchoring in more detail as a specifi c kind of domain narrowing and discuss some predictions.
We call the mechanism which introduces a functional dependency into the restrictor of an indefi nite, modelled as an existential quantifi er, referential anchoring. Th e operation can be formally given as the enrichment operator in (28).
Th is is a pragmatic operation in the sense that in the case of plain indefi nites headed by an indefi nite article that may have but do not semantically encode functional readings, this operation comes on top of the semantic representation of the indefi nite determiner. We model it as a local operation, but in principle it could be modelled in more procedural terms as well.
Hans Kamp (p.c.) pointed out to us that this operator is not formally restricted to indefi nites. But we don't think that this is a problem. Th ere are pragmatic reasons the operator does not apply to other quantifi ers. For one thing, domain reduction to one single element would be pragmatically weird in the case of e.g. a universal quantifi er: if the speaker knows that the restrictor of every has exactly one element, he has little reason to use the universal quantifi er. One benefi t is, then, that the choice of diff erent types of expressions denoting existential quantifi ers could similarly ease or block the enrichment operation -for instance, there is little reason to allow at least one boy to be narrowed down to a singleton. One can easily put up a blocking argument to this extent.
In the case of indefi nite determiners that only allow functional readings we take the existence of the corresponding function and its argument variable to be presupposed, as in (30). We call the function anchoring function and we call the variable the anchor , or anchor variable . Note that we generally assume that indefi nite determiners encode additional restrictions on the possible values of f and y . We leave this problem for the discussion of the Russian data in Section 4.
Referential anchoring can be conceptualized as a device to account for Fodor and Sag's (1982) original intuition that indefi nites may occasionally function as constants, i.e. by using an indefi nite the speaker may intend to refer to a particular individual. Th e constant, hence, stands for the individual which the speaker has in mind at a particular point in the discourse. Referential anchoring captures this idea by making the functional defi nition of the constant term explicit: we take the function λz. ι y. z intends to refer to y at t , which we then apply to the speaker. t is a time variable that can be used to deal with the situation where the speaker uses several indefi nites in a discourse. Whenever the function λz. ι y. z intends to refer to y at t is included into the representation of an indefi nite, we allow for a singular ("Russellian") proposition interpretation. We do not elaborate on this issue, cf. Kamp and Bende-Farkas ( 2010 ) for a very similar view. We call such a case epistemic specifi city . Referential anchoring goes beyond epistemic specifi city. Consider for instance the example given in (31) (adapted from Higginbotham, 1987 ) . While in (31a) the hearer can safely assume that the speaker, George, is speaking about the student he has in mind, Jack, the speaker of (31b), may be in no position to say which student George met, but he may still be speaking about the very student George had in mind when uttering (31a). In (31a) the referent of the indefi nite is anchored to the speaker. In one reading of (31b) it is anchored to another discourse individual, George. Th e anchoring to discourse items distinct from the speaker has been called relative specifi city in von Heusinger ( 2002 ) as a more general case of specifi city.
(31) a. George: "I met a certain student of mine today". b. Jack: "George said that he met a certain student of his today".
Th us referential anchoring can capture this distinction. Note that the function λz.ιy. z intends to refer to y at t can be applied in both cases. Of course the time variable can be equated to the time at which George told Jack that he met a certain student of his. In the more general (non-quotational) case, however, a weaker function is better suited : λz.ιy. the y that z can identify as a witness to p , where p is the actual assertion about y . Th is predicts that if one utters a sentence involving a certain and he has no particular individual in mind but his evidence for the truth of the assertion goes back to some other individual i , he can only use a certain felicitously if it is presupposed that i has a particular witness for his conveyed information. In other words, in the case of relative specifi city we assume that there is an epistemically specifi c use of the indefi nite by the anchor individual. Th is also predicts that only sentient individuals can be used as anchors for relative specifi city. Note that von Heusinger ( 2002 ) is neutral with regard to this prediction. Referential anchoring, as we understand it, can also capture cases of anchoring to non-sentient individuals. In principle, any function and any anchor will do when no lexically coded constraints apply. Th e basic representation is highly underspecifi ed by default. Of course, this doesn't exclude the possibility that some/indefi nite determiners actually encode the special cases of epistemic or relative specifi city. Kamp and Bende-Farkas ( 2010 ) call anchored representation . An anchored representation means that the speaker is ultimately able to identify the individual he intends to refer to by using an indefinite even if he doesn't know exactly who that individual is. Our approach is more general, though less elaborate in terms of psychological reality and plausibility. Th e obvious advantage is, that it allows readings in which such an identifi ability feature is actually hard to assess, as in the case of functional readings under quantifi ers: If f and y are constants in the environment in which the indefi nite is interpreted, the additional restriction contributed by functional dependency guarantees a singleton indefi nite and we get an apparent widest scope reading in non-transparent or quantifi cational contexts, but if y is bound by some quantifi er in the sentence, functional intermediate readings are also possible, for which identifi ability seems a very weak feature.
Referential anchoring is related in an obvious way to what Breheny ( 2003 ) calls an identifying idea and what
Th e fact that our system is essentially pragmatic but allows the inclusion of referential anchoring as part of the lexical semantics of some indefi nites constitutes an advantage over Kratzer ( 1998 ) , who necessarily postulates lexical ambiguity for expressions like some . At fi rst sight this is only a matter of theoretical choice, for one could in principle model pragmatic phenomena in the lexicon, so that the pragmatics is responsible for selecting the right lexical entry. But on a closer look, there may be independent considerations against the lexical ambiguity analysis. As argued in Endriss ( 2009 ) , in some contexts wide readings do not arise even though pragmatically they would be the only felicitous ones, as in the German sentence in (32), which only allows for a narrow scope interpretation for ein Autor ("an author") with unmarked intonation.
(32) Niemand hat ein Buch, das von einem Autor geschrieben wurde, gelesen.
Nobody has a book that from a author written has-been read "Nobody read a book that was written by an author".
Kratzer argues that plain exceptional wide scope readings must be accounted for by Skolemized choice functions, and hence, (32) is an explanandum for her theory, to say the least. Since we take Kratzer's (1998) theory to only apply to functional readings, the argument loses some of its power, but shows at least that our pragmatic approach has potential advantages (and no disadvantage) in such cases.
Referential anchoring can combine with additional contextual domain restrictions. (33), on the most natural reading, is verifi ed by a crying boy in the classroom.
(33) We just entered a classroom full of children. A boy was crying.
Suppose that the speaker of (33) has some boy in mind who is not in the classroom, say, a boy living in another country, and that boy is indeed crying. In the classroom, however, no boy is crying. In this situation, without further context, the sentence is simply false. Yet, if referential anchoring to the speaker were the only mechanism of domain narrowing that applies to indefi nites, we would predict the sentence to be true, since the boy the speaker has in mind is indeed crying. Similarly, if we were to assume that domain narrowing with respect to the previously mentioned group of children is the only domain narrowing mechanism at work here, an epistemically specifi c reading should not be possible. Th is is because this reading would need an additional domain narrowing to a singleton set; however, the set of boys already narrowed to the class contains more than one boy. Th e two domain narrowing mechanisms are in confl ict. Th e problem disappears if we assume that referential anchoring is applied on top of the additional domain narrowing which guarantees that the domain of quantifi cation is the set of children in the classroom. One step reduces the restrictor set to the set of boys in the classroom and the other mechanism reduces this already restricted set to a singleton: the singleton domain narrowing comes from referential anchoring.
If this is correct, the fact that partitives are subject to pragmatic domain narrowing has nothing to do with referential anchoring. Regardless of whether the domain of quantifi cation is narrowed contextually, referential anchoring of indefi nites may or may not apply. Th is point is further supported by the observation that a certain can be used with or without partitive expressions, (34a) vs. (34b). Th is fi nding neatly ties in with the observation in Kornfi lt and von Heusinger (2009) that in Turkish, partitive indefi nites need not be specifi c, i.e. referentially anchored, contrary to what has been formerly suggested by Enç ( 1991 ) .
(34) a. We just entered a classroom. A certain boy was crying.
b. We just entered a classroom. A certain boy out of the boys in the classroom was crying.
We will show in the next section that referential anchoring can be seen as a general framework to analyze indefi nite determiners. In order to achieve the necessary fl exibility, we allow the function and the anchor to be completely unrestricted in principle. Hence any function and any anchor will do. Of course if, say, the function is purely abstract and the anchor is, for instance, a possible world, we seemingly depart from our original intention to stick with Fodor and Sag's (1982) intuition that referential anchoring has something to do with referential intentions. We take referential intentions not to be a necessary aspect of referential anchoring. Instead they are a pragmatically prominent special case that we actually expect to fi nd more often in grammaticalized form in natural language precisely because they are particularly useful. In the most general case, referential anchoring only refl ects the intuition that the interpretation of an indefi nite depends on something, hence in principle giving the hearer some additional clue in the interpretation -this intuition is related to Farkas' (2002) account of dependent indefi nites.
Referential Anchoring and Russian Determiners
In this section we show how the mechanism of referential anchoring can capture the diff erence between three indefi nite determiners in Russian, thus demonstrating its usefulness for linguistic theory. Th e diff erence between the three determiners will be analyzed in terms of lexically encoded constraints on referential anchoring.
Russian has no indefi nite article. Indefi nite noun phrases can be accompanied by diff erent indefi nite pronouns used as determiners specifying diff erent interpretations of the respective NP. Indefi nite pronouns are formed of a whword and an affi x such as the prefi x koe-or the suffi x -to or -nibud' , as shown in (35). Note that the translations are only approximations.
(35) a. koe-kakaja studentka koe-which student "a certain student (speaker knows which one)" b. kakaja -to studentka which-to student "a certain student (speaker doesn't know which one)" c. kakaja -nibud' studentka which-nibud' student "some student or another"
While koe-kakoj ("koe-which") and kakoj-to ("which-to") have been analyzed as specifi city markers while others like kakoj-nibud' ("which-nibud'") seem to mark non-specifi city (cf. Dahl, 1970 Dahl, , 1999 Haspelmath, 1997 ; Ioup, 1977 ) . However, we will show that all three of them encode functional dependencies, and even the non-specifi city of kakoj-nibud' can be captured as a kind of referential anchoring.
Indefi nite Pronouns with "koe-" and "-to"
Th e most important common property of the indefi nites accompanied by -to or koe-is that they generally take widest possible scope over both quantifi ers and opaque operators regardless of scope islands. Relatively simple cases are shown in (36) and (37) in which the universal quantifi er interacts with the indefi nite NP. Th e main diff erence between the two determiners is that while koe-signals that the speaker knows the referent of the indefi nite or, in other words, has some particular referent in mind, -to signals precisely the opposite.
(36) Kazhdyj student voschischchaetsja koe-kakim professorom. Every student admires koe-which professor "Every student admires a certain professor the speaker can identify". (37) Kazhdyj student voschischchaetsja kakim-to professorom.
Every student admires which-to professor "Every student admires a certain professor the speaker cannot identify". Kagan ( 2007 ) assumes that this diff erence in identifi ability is based on conventional implicatures (Potts, 2007 ), but we have argued in Geist and Onea ( 2007 ) that -to needn't conventionally code at whatever level of semantic representation that the speaker does not have a particular referent in mind. Th e inference that the referent is not identifi able by the speaker in (37) can be derived as a conversational implicature. Th is implicature arises from the fact that the hearer knows that if the speaker had some specifi c professor in mind he would use the koe-item since the referential anchor for -koe indefi nites is invariably the speaker. If -to is used, it conversationally implies that the condition for speaker identifi ability is not met. We also reject Kagan's (2007) idea that the inference that when using koe -the speaker has a particular referent in mind is a conventional implicature. Our arguments are given below.
Th ere is an additional component of the meaning of koe-, namely that the speaker doesn't indend to disclose the referent of the indefi nite in discourse. Kagan ( 2007 ) shows that this component has the status of a conventional implicature. Th is component distinguishes koe-from items which signal identifi ability by the speaker in other languages. E.g. Ionin ( 2006 ) argues that indefi nite this in English signals that the speaker intends to say more about its referent and Chiriacescu and von Heusinger (2010) argue that in Romanian diff erentially marked direct objects have a similar property. Koe-does the exact opposite.
Th is leads to the representations in (38) and (39), in which koe-and -to lexicalize diff erent constraints on referential anchoring. We assume that referential anchoring is lexically coded in koe -with the constraint that the referential anchor argument y is the speaker and the function f must be spelled out as intends to refer to . Th is is shown in (38). For -to we assume a preliminary representation in (39), in which both f and y are underspecifi ed. Although the speaker is not an appropriate anchor for -to -indefi nites, other discourse items are available to serve as referential anchors. Like in (31b), in (40) the appropriate anchor for the -to indefi nite is the subject of the matrix clause, Igor, who reported about a particular student he can identify or has in mind. Example (41) can be analyzed in a similar fashion as (40). However, the anchor need not be a sentient one, it can also be the piece of evidence from which the speaker concluded that someone has cheated, and since the arising functional dependency is trivially true, there is no additional impact on the interpretation.
(40) Igor skazal, chto kakoj-to student schpargalil na ekzamene. Igor said that which-to student cheated on exam "Igor said that some student cheated on the exam". (Th e speaker cannot tell which one but Igor can.) (41) Kakoj-to student schpargalil na ekzamene.
which-to student cheated on exam "Some student cheated on the exam". (Th e speaker cannot identify the student.)
While for koe-the function and the anchor are specifi ed by the lexical entry, for -to the function and the anchor should be specifi ed in some context. Th is predicts a diff erence between -to and koe-indefi nites: koe -indefi nites must always have functional widest readings, since their referential anchor is the speaker which is outside of other sentential operators, while to -items should be more fl exible, since the referential anchor could be in principle bound by a sentence internal quantifi er. Th e prediction is borne out: In (42b), koe-gets a wide functional reading, whereas (43) shows that -to can get either a wide functional reading (43b) or a narrow functional reading (43c), depending on the specifi cation of the anchor variable.
(42) a. Kazhdyj student voschischchaetsja koe-kakim professorom. Every student admires koe-which professor "Every student admires a certain professor". b. (∀x) (S(x) → (∃y) (P(y) & ιz. speaker intends to refer to z at t = y& A( x , y ))) (43) a. Kazhdyj student voschischchaetsja kakim-to professorom.
Every student admires which-to professor "Every student admires a certain professor".
where c is a contextually bound variable c.
Crucially, however, -to cannot get a "narrow scope" reading under an opaque operator such as hotet' "to want". In (38), Igor needs to know who he wants to marry. Hence, assuming that to want quantifi es over worlds or situations, we assume that for -to indefi nites either the anchor cannot be of type w(orld) or s(ituation) , or -as we will see in the next section -there is an independent constraint ruling out this reading.
(44) Igor' hochet zhenit'sja na kakoj-to studentke.
Igor wants marry at which-to student "Igor wants to marry a certain student".
In the representation of koe , we did not assume that the information that the speaker has a referent in mind is a conventional implicature. Th e main reason for this is that conventional implicatures don't seem to be the right kind of semantic device to bind variables which then remain unbound in the asserted representation. Of course, this is not an empirical argument. If indeed koeconventionally implied that the speaker can identify the referent, and we cannot model this inference as a conventional implicature, this would simply mean that we are wrong with our basic representation of koe -as coding constraints on referential anchoring. However, it is not clear how to see the diff erence, as the typical properties of conventional implicatures follow from our representation as well, without having to assume an additional level of representation. Th e inference at stake cannot be cancelled, for it is a conventional part of the meaning of koe-, as shown in (45). But I don't know him. "Mary spoke with a certain professor. But I don't know him". Th e inference is detachable, since it comes from a specifi c morpheme, namely koe-. If we use -to instead of koe-the inference goes away, but, that only shows that there is a semantic diff erence between koe-and -to , and not that a conventional implicature is involved. Th e inference is "speaker-oriented" even when the NP with koe-is embedded. Again, this is predicted simply because the anchor variable is invariably bound by the speaker. Occasionally it is possible that the speaker variable gets bound by some attitude holder in the sentence, cf. Malamud ( 2010 ), but this is both possible on our analysis and on the conventional implicatures analysis. Th e fact that koe-indefi nites scope over negation also comes for free: From the speaker perspective koe-indefi nites are defi nite descriptions; hence, they cannot be negated. Th is follows from our formal representation as well, as one can easily reconstruct. Finally, the independence of the at-issue meaning (cf. Potts, 2007 ) , which is the nonpresuppositional conventionally conveyed meaning, is quite impossible to test, since the at-issue meaning of indefi nites is the introduction of a new discourse item/referent. Crucially, however, once the discourse item the speaker has in mind is present in the discourse one cannot use an indefi nite to refer to it, as this would introduce an additional discourse referent. But at least we can show that the meaning component that the speaker can identify the referent of a koe -indefi nite can be contrasted, as shown in (46), which certainly doesn't seem to be compatible with the idea that the inference cannot be at-issue.
(46) a. Kto-to ukral knigu iz biblioteki. who-to has stolen a book from the library "Somebody has stolen a book from the library". b. Interesno, a koe-kto tozhe! actually, but koe -who too. "Actually, somebody too". Intended meaning: A has also stolen a book from the library, but the speaker doesn't want to tell who it was Finally there is another apparent problem of our analysis of koe-. In example (47) the koe-indefi nite can have a narrow scope reading, according to which diff erent people may have learned diff erent things. Since in our analysis koe-indefi nites are anchored to the speaker they are predicted to always take wide scope. Th e narrow scope reading we fi nd in (47) should be excluded. However, this reading is in fact available. We assume, following the traditional literature on indefi niteness in Russian that koe -is ambiguous (Birkenmaier, 1979 ; Paducheva, 1985 ) . While one koe-(koe 1 -) indicates that the speaker has a particular single referent in mind -the property we captured in our analysis -, the other koe-(koe 2 -) as in (47) refers to a plurality and means just "more than one" or "many", cf. the two readings of (48). Interestingly, the plurality interpretation in (48b) is only available for indefinite pronouns with koe-such as koe-kto ("koe-who"), koe-chto ("koe-what"), etc. For the indefi nite determiner koe-kakoj such interpretation never arises, i.e. koe-kakoj mal'chik ("koe-which boy") can only have a singular interpretation. Th e diff erence follows if koe 1 -and koe 2 -are homonymous: while koe 1 -can be (a part of ) an indefi nite determiner, koe 2 -can only be (a part of ) an indefi nite pronoun. We assume that unlike koe 1 -koe 2 -does not involve referential anchoring but just indicates a plurality interpretation.
Russian Indefi nite Pronouns "-to" vs. "-nibud'"
In this section we will introduce the nibud' -determiner and compare it to -to in order to identify additional grammaticalization patterns of referential anchoring.
Indefi nites accompanied by a determiner with the suffi x -nibud' must always have narrowest possible scope. Th e wide scope reading is not available.
(49) a. Kazhdyj student objazatel'no voschischchaetsja kakim-nibud' professorom.
Every student necessarily admires which-nibud' professor "As a rule, every student admires a professor". b. * 'the same professor for all students' → wide scope c. OK 'diff erent professors' → narrow scope Th e question arises whether this means that -nibud' is not referentially anchored at all, or whether in fact -nibud' is referentially anchored to the quantifi er that c-commands it. If the latter is the case, nibud' is similar to -to , which can also depend on quantifi ers. If so, what is the diff erence between -nibud' and -to apart from the fact that -to can also take wider readings? Consider examples (50) and (51) from the Russian National Corpus (RNC), which seem to highlight the diff erence.
(50) Ochevidno kazhdoe chislo oboznachaet kakuju-to bukvu.
[RNC1] probably every number indicates which-to letter "Probably every number stands for a certain letter". (51) Dlja kazhdogo teatra u babushki byl kakoj-nibud' For every theater at grandmother was which-nibud' objazatel'nyj fetish: dlja Bol'shogo-broshka dlja malogo-busiki… [RNC2] obligatory Fetish for Bolshoj a brooch for Malyj a necklace "For each theatre the grandmother had a very special obligatory piece of jewellery: for Bolshoj theatre a brooch, for Maly theatre a necklace…".
Our intuition for (50) is that the speaker calls the hearer's attention to the existence of some code which systematically assigns numbers to particular letters. However, this code need not be known by the speaker. Th e existence of a systematic procedure which maps numbers to letters is just presupposed if -to is used in such a context. By contrast, the continuation of the clause in (51) contains a pair-list enumeration. Th is is clearly a case of a "narrow scope" reading of the indefi nite with respect to the universal quantifi er. In the pair-list enumeration pieces of jewelry are arbitrarily assigned to theatres. Of course, even in this case, there is a function which assigns jewelry to theatres, as discussed in Section 2.3.3 but this is prima facie just a diff erent way to conceptualize narrow scope. Th e crucial observation is the intuition of native speakers that such a function must be unsystematic at least as far as the speaker is concerned. Th is means that not any function will satisfy the meaning of (51): the systematic ones are ruled out. Th is is a clear sign that -nibud' does place constraints on possible functions, and, hence, signals some kind of referential anchoring. Th e function cannot be a trivial Skolem function, obtained by Skolemizing a narrow scope existential, since this would not alter the meaning.
Th us the diff erence between -to and -nibud' can be described as follows: under a functional narrow reading -to indicates the availability of a systematic function, while -nibud' , which also triggers a narrow functional reading of the indefi nite, indicates that the function is non-systematic. Th is intuition can be formulated as a hypothesis that can be tested empirically.
(52) Hypothesis:
In contexts with quantifi ers -to indicates a systematic functional dependency, if its anchor is bound by a quantifi er; -nibud' indicates that the function is non-systematic.
Th is predicts the following preferences for uses of -to and -nibud' .
(53) Predictions: A. In contexts providing a systematic dependency -to indefi nites are preferred. B. In contexts providing no systematic dependency -nibud' is preferred.
In order to test these predictions we conducted a web-experiment consisting of a context-based forced choice task. Th e participants had to read a story and judge the target sentences with -to and -nibud' as appropriate or inappropriate in the context of the story. Th ey had to select between three possibilities: a) a sentence with -to , b) a sentence with -nibud' or c) neither. We constructed a total of 8 stories: 4 with a systematic dependency and 4 with an unsystematic dependency. Each participant saw one of the 8 stories and two fi llers in a socalled between-subject design . Th is design was needed since the stories were extremely similar, and we wanted to avoid any bias. Th e fi llers were identical in format to the test items. Th ey were the same for all participants, again, to avoid any uncontrolled bias. Two sample stories with target sentences are given in (54) and (55). Th e story in (54) is designed to provide a systematic functional dependency where we expected most informants to choose the target sentence with -to . Th e story in (55) provided a non-systematic dependency and -nibud' was expected to be preferred.
(54) Th e story provides a systematic function John's grandmother likes to go to the theatre. She is a very systematic woman, she used to work as an accountant in a factory. She now carefully developed a system which clothes and jewellery to wear for each theatre. For every theatre, she wears the piece of jewellery which best matches the colour of the seats. a) Johns grandmother wears for every theatre kakoj-to piece of jewellery. b) Johns grandmother wears for every theatre kakoj-nibud ' piece of jewellery c) Both a) and b) are inappropriate in this situation. (55) Th e story provides a non-systematic function John's grandmother is a very weird woman. For some totally incomprehensible reason she wears some special clothes and jewellery for each theatre she visits. When she goes to the Bolshoi theatre she wears her red brooch, when she goes to the Pushkin theatre, she wears a huge golden ring and so on. She is very funny but also crazy. a) Johns grandmother wears for every theatre kakoj-to piece of jewellery. b) Johns grandmother wears for every theatre kakoj-nibud ' piece of jewellery c) Both a) and b) are inappropriate in this situation.
86 native Russian speakers participated in the study. Th e main results are given in Table 1 . Th e results are consistent with our predictions in (53). As Table 1 show, in contexts providing a systematic dependency, -to is used in 48% of all cases. In contexts providing unsystematic dependency -nibud' is preferred (53%). From a diff erent perspective, -to was selected twice as often in +systematic contexts as in non-systematic ones. We performed a χ 2 -test on the matrix arising by combining -to , and -nibud with the feature + or -systematic. Th e choice not to include the neither row is justifi ed by the nature of the χ 2 independence test, since in this row we do not expect nor do we fi nd a diff erence between systematic and non-systematic contexts. Th e are highly signifi cant: χ 2 =5,324074, df=1, p<0.025. Note that there is quite a lot of noise in the data, due to possible misinterpretations in one of our stimuli, but to achieve statistical signifi cance it was not necessary to remove that item.
Th us, our hypothesis is confi rmed. However, the availability of a systematic, procedurally defi ned function (Jacobson, 1999 ) seems to be necessary only for the narrow or intermediate functional readings of Russian -to indefi nites, since we have shown above that -to indefi nites can have wide functional readings as well. In the latter case we assume that the anchor is not bound by a quantifi er in the sentence but rather by some higher discourse referent. When the anchor is co-referential with some already established, higher discourse referent we call it referentially fi xed. However, if the anchor is referentially fi xed, the systematicity of the function is irrelevant, since we are only interested in the value of the function for one particular argument. For this reason we assume that the function is trivially systematic in such a case. Th e two interpretational possibilities for -to indefi nites can be captured in the fi nal lexical entry given in (56).
it is presupposed that f is a systematic contextually determined function
Note that the entry in (56) also immediately predicts that -to will not enter functional dependencies with world or situation variables quantifi ed over by opaque operators, as shown in (44). Th is is not because worlds were of the wrong type for being anchors for -to , but because functions from worlds to individuals are rather non-systematic. Some additional words must be said about the determiner -nibud' . Th is determiner has a very restricted distribution. In simple declarative sentences like (57) -nibud' is excluded. Th e insertion of a modal operator as in (58) improves the sentence.
(57) *Petja pogovoril s kakim-nibud' juristom. Petja spoke with which-nibud' lawyer "Petja spoke with some lawyer". (58) Petja hochet pogovorit' s kakim-nibud' juristom. Petja wants to-speak with which-nibud' lawyer "Petja wants to speak with some lawyer". Pereltsvaig ( 2008 ) and Yanovich ( 2005 ) claim that, besides modals, quantificational DPs such as every boy or every year can license -nibud' as well, cf. (59) and (60).
(59) Kazhdyj mal'chik nes kakuju-nibud' tjazhest' Every boy carried which-nibud' load "Every boy carried some load". (60) Kazhdyj god proishodjat kakuju-nibud' izmenenija.
Every year happen which-nibud' changes. "Every year some changes take place". Pereltsvaig ( 2008 ) does not provide an explicit formal analysis of -nibud' indefi nites but refers to Farkas's (1997) analysis of the reduplicated indefi nite article egy-egy in Hungarian, which in her opinion may be applied to Russian. Th ere is an obvious issue with this analogy, namely that Hungarian egy-egy is restricted to contexts of quantifi cation over individuals, while -nibud seems unrestricted with regard to the possible anchor variables: individuals as in (59), times as in (60) and possible worlds as in the modal context (58) can serve as appropriate anchors for it. Pereltsvaig observes this and argues that nibud ' is less restricted than egy-egy . However, in fact this is not entirely correct. We assume that nibud ' is strongly restricted and can only take situation anchor arguments in the sense of Kratzer ( 1989 ) .
Th e introduction of situations is primarily motivated by the following observation. Our informants do not accept -nibud' in all contexts with quantifi cational DPs such as every boy . Most informants do not accept (61), in which a quantifi cational DP c-commands the nibud' -indefi nite. Th is suggests that the anchoring of -nibud' -indefi nites to individual variables is subject to additional restrictions. Th ese restrictions are not related to the type of quantifi er DP. We assume, however, that they can be formulated in situation semantics, since adding any kind of modality in the larger context dramatically improves the examples.
(61) *Kazhdyj mal'chik vchera poceloval kakuju-nibud' odnoklassnicu. Every boy yesterday kissed which-nibud' classmate "Yesterday, every boy kissed some classmate".
To capture the occurrences of -nibud' in the above mentioned contexts we extend Yanovich's (2005) analysis of -nibud' as dependent on the variable which must be bound by a universal quantifi er. In our notation this idea can be implemented as in (62). it is presupposed that ¬ s ≤ p w 0
Note that the presupposition that the situation s is not part of the real world w 0 in (62) is a strong simplifi cation, and additional constraints on situations should be added since not all situations are appropriate anchors for -nibud' . Th e lexical entry in (62) can account for the very restricted distribution of -nibud' and for the preference to use it in situations which do not provide a systematic function, since functions from (somewhat modal) situations to individuals do not seem to be systematic. In the reminder of this section we want to compare our analysis with alternative analyses of -to and koe-in other frameworks. Kagan ( 2007 ) captures the diff erence between koe-and -to without our proposed mechanism of lexically coded referential anchoring. She claims that koe-signals inherent speaker identifi ability, i.e. it picks up the same individual in every possible world that is compatible with the speaker's worldview. In contrast, -to inherently specifi es the speaker non-identifi ability of the referent. In her analysis the non-identifi ability of the referent by the speaker is the only property in which -to diff ers from koe-. However, as the discussion of the data above has shown, this view is too simplistic. As we have seen, -to diff ers from koe-in the felicity of intermediate and narrow functional readings, which are not available for koe-indefi nites. Th e assumption of (non)-identifi ability as the only distinctive feature between -to and koe-cannot capture this diff erence. Moreover, non-specifi city markers like -nibud' have also been generally assumed to mark non-identifi ability of the referent by the speaker. Th is suggests that the feature of non-identifi ability is not suffi cient to capture the differences between indefi nite determiners in general. Yanovich ( 2005 ) has proposed that for -to a choice functional analysis in the spirit of Kratzer ( 1998 ) is appropriate. According to him -to codes a choice function with no Skolem argument.
constraint is a constraint on domain narrowing. Now, there are two possibilities to deal with such a case. One would be to attempt to give a competing analysis for algún in terms of referential anchoring. Th is doesn't seem impossible, as there seems to be a modal component in the interpretation of algún , and this would in principle be suitable as a world/situation-anchor, hence allowing for the modal interpretation more directly than Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito ( 2009 ) suggest. Of course, one would then need a theory that derives the interpretation in the non-modal cases. We do not claim that such a theory can actually be developed, however, we also do not see why this would be impossible as such. Alternatively one could simply accept AlonsoOvalle and Menéndez-Benito's (2009) analysis and contend that domain narrowing is the most general framework for modelling indefi nite interpretation, and referential anchoring is one prominent type of domain narrowing that gets lexicalized in some languages but, crucially, in other languages other possible constraints on domain narrowing can be lexicalized.
Summary and Conclusion
Th is paper provides a unifi ed representation of indefi nite NPs based on the assumption that the semantic core of indefi niteness involves existential quantifi cation. We assume a general domain narrowing operation called referential anchoring that applies to these existential quantifi ers. Th is operation introduces a functional dependency into the restrictor of the existential quantifi er. Moreover, we have shown that it is possible to model a wide array of readings indefi nites may have in terms of referential anchoring. In addition, we claim that referential anchoring may be a pragmatic operation but can also get grammaticalized in natural language, therefore becoming part of the semantic representation of indefi nite determiners. We have demonstrated how this can be modelled for Russian indefi nite determiners.
We have also argued that referential anchoring as such is not responsible for exceptional scope readings discussed in the literature, even though many linguists have used similar formal tools to derive those readings. Th is discussion is less important for us, since our primariy aim was to capture the meaning variation of indefi nite determiners, which indeed appear to lexicalize constraints on referential anchoring. Since the exceptional scope discussion is -as far as we can judge it -not decided yet, our approach hinges on the right theory of scope for indefi nites. However, we assume that it is conceptually compatible with a great number of possible approaches. Th e next step would be to check whether the application of referential anchoring can adequately capture diff erences between indefi nite determiners in other languages -this work we leave for the future. 
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